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RECENT CASES
may be able to obtain relief by removal to, and change of venue in the Federal
courts.' 2 1 The specter of remaining due process restrictions should not be too
quickly invoked to make the plaintiff's task unreasonably difficult or expensive.'
22
It must be remembered that there is a point at which the denial of a nearby
forum to the injured plaintiff is offensive to "traditional concepts of fair play
and substantial justice."' 23  DOUGLAS C. DODGE
COMMERCIAL LAW-UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE--DRAwER-
BANK OF TELLER'S CHECK CANNOT STOP PAYMENT WHEN NOT PARTY TO
UNDERLYING TRANSACTION
Carole Kuebler purchased a teller's check from the drawer Savings Bank.
The check was in the sum of $450 payable to the order of payee Malphrus and
drawn on the Commercial Bank. Payee Malphrus received the check in part
payment for an automobile delivered to Miss Kuebler. Drawer Savings Bank
stopped payment on its teller's check upon the request of Miss Kuebler. When
payee Malphrus presented the check to the Commercial Bank, payment was
refused due to drawer Savings Bank's stop order. Payee Malphrus sued the
drawer Savings Bank for the amount of the check. The court held that where a
bank issued a teller's check payable to a seller and received consideration for the
check from the buyer, the check was considered a certified check and payment
could not be stopped by the bank. Malphrus v. Home Savings Bank, 44 Misc. 2d
705, 254 N.Y.S.2d 980 (Albany County Ct. 1965).
Generally, an ordinary check is taken as conditional payment of an under-
lying obligation.' It does not operate as an assignment of funds in the hands of
a drawee bank available for its payment, and the drawee bank is not liable on a
check until accepted.2 A drawer of a check is not discharged on an underlying
debt until a seller or creditor presents a check to a drawee bank and the check
is accepted 3 or paid.4 Since delivery of an ordinary check does not constitute
absolute payment nor discharge of a drawer, a drawer may stop payment on the
check.5 Payment may be stopped for any valid reason' if timely notice is given
121. Assuming requisite jurisdictional amount is involved; see 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1441,
1404(a), 1406(a). In light of the typical injuries in the cases involved herein, this assump-
tion seems warranted.
122. See Jesmer, Recent Decisions Affecting § 17, 48 I1. Bar Jour. 132 (1959).
123. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940) ; quoted with approval in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
1. See Carroll v. Sweet, 128 N.Y. 19, 27 N.E. 763 (1891); Burkhalter v. Second Nat'l
Bank, 42 N.Y. 538 (1870); 1 Paton, Digest of Legal Opinions 1091 (1940).
2. N.Y. Uniform Commercial Code (hereafter referred to as U.C.C.) § 3-409(1).
3. "Acceptance is the drawee's signed engagement to honor the draft as presented." N.Y.
U.C.C. § 3-410(1).
4. See N.Y. U.C.C. § 4-213(1) for determination of when an item is finally paid.
5. Florence Mining Co. v. Brown, 124 U.S. 385, 391 (1888); see Glennan v. Rochester
Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 209 N.Y. 12, 16, 102 N.E. 537, 539 (1913).
6. Generally, payment is stopped because of fraud or failure of consideration in the
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to the drawee bank.7 Until an ordinary check is accepted or paid, payment is
conditional and can be stopped.
A teller's check represents an exception to this general rule of conditional
payment, it being likened to a certified or cashier's check.8 A cashier's check is a
bill of exchange drawn by a bank on itself and accepted in advance by the act
of its issuance.9 The bank acts as both drawer and drawee and becomes abso-
lutely liable for payment at the time of its issuance.' 0 It is generally stated that
payment cannot be stopped on a cashier's check." Under the common law, pay-
ment could be stopped on an ordinary check certified at the request of a drawer
as against the payee.' 2 Payment could not be stopped, however, on a check
certified at the request of the payee or holder.'3 This distinction was nullified in
1944 when an addition to the New York Negotiable Instruments Law' 4 made
null and void any attempt to stop payment of certified checks. As of September
27, 1964 the New York Negotiable Instruments Law was repealed by the Uni-
form Commercial Code.15 Nevertheless, the Code continues the rule of no stop
payment with respect to certified checks. 16
The instant case represents one of the first New York cases to be gov-
erned by the Uniform Commercial Code. The Code is not explicit on the issue
of stop payment, but the court employs section 3-802 of the Code to support a
policy conclusion. Relying first on sections 4-403(1) 17 and 4-104(1)(e) 18 the
court concludes that a bank as drawer may stop payment on a check. A teller's
check, however, presents a legal distinction. The court declares that unlike an
transaction in which the check was given, or because the instrument itself is lost, strayed, or
stolen. See 20 U. Chi. L. Rev. 667, 668 (1953).
7. N.Y. U.C.C. § 4-403(1).
8. See Hannon v. Alleghany Bellevue Land Co., 44 Pa. Super. 266, 273 (1910), where a
teller's check is defined: "For all practical purposes in modern mercantile transactions a
teller's check is but a substitute for a certified check and much more closely resembles it
than it does a bill of exchange, strictly speaking, and ... it is none the less a check because
drawn by an executive officer of the bank upon the institution he serves." In the instant case
the teller's check is not drawn on the drawer Savings Bank because savings banks in New
York State are not permitted to draw checks on themselves. (See N.Y. Banking Law § 234 as
to the general powers of savings banks and N.Y. Banking Law § 238(3) as to regulations
and restrictions on repayment of deposits.) For all other purposes, a teller's check in New
York is similar to a certified or cashier's check.
9. In the Matter of Bank of United States, 243 App. Div. 287, 291, 277 N.Y. Supp. 96,
100 (1st Dep't 1935) ; accord, Kohler v. First Nat'l Bank, 157 Wash. 417, 289 Pac. 47 (1930);
Walker v. Sellers, 201 Ala. 189, 77 So. 715 (1918).
10. See In the Matter of Bank of United States, supra note 9.
11. Bobrick v. Second Nat'l Bank, 175 App. Div. 550, 553, 162 N.Y. Supp. 147, 149
(1st Dep't 1916).
12. See Welch v. Bank of the Manhattan Co., 264 App. Div. 906, 35 N.Y.S.2d 894 (2d
Dep't 1942).
13. See Carnegie Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 213 N.Y. 301, 305, 107 N.E. 693, 694
(1915).
14. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1944, ch. 537, § 1.
15. N.Y. U.C.C. § 10-102(1).
16. See N.Y. U.C.C. § 4-403, official comment 5 which refers to U.C.C. §§ 3-411 and
4-303 as authority for the statement that there is no right to stop payment after certification.
17. "A customer may by order to his bank stop payment of any item payable for his
account ... "
18. "'Customer' means any person having an account with a bank or for whom a bank
has agreed to collect items and includes a bank carrying an account with another bank."
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ordinary check situation the drawer (Savings Bank) here is not a party to the
underlying transaction.' 9 It states that certified checks bear a similar character-
istic. The court relies on section 3-802(1) of the Code2° as support for the legal
consequences of this similarity. Under section 3-802(1) the underlying obligor
(Miss Kuebler) is discharged on her underlying obligation. Then if the drawer
Savings Bank is not liable on the check, the court reasons that the payee would
have no recourse. The policy of the Uniform Commercial Code is to protect
persons (payees) engaged in business transactions involving instruments for the
payment of money including checks.21 In order to satisfy this policy, the teller's
check is considered a certified check with the drawer Savings Bank having no
concern in the underlying transaction and thus having no right to stop payment.
A teller's check is a device used here to insure performance of the buyer's
payment obligation. As the court suggests the drawer Savings Bank assumes a
primary obligation on the instrument and the underlying obligor of the sales
transaction is discharged. 22 If the buyer is discharged on the underlying obliga-
tion, does her reason for wanting to stop payment inure to the drawer Savings
Bank? The court concludes that where the drawer (Savings Bank) is not a party
to the underlying sales transaction it cannot claim a defense to that transaction
by stopping payment on its teller's check. The Savings Bank's primary obliga-
tion to pay the instrument is similar to a typical commercial letter of credit
situation. An issuer of a letter of credit is not permitted to go beyond its contract
to pay the "beneficiary" of the credit 2 3 It has no concern with an underlying
sales transaction completed between "customer" and "beneficiary." The policy
in both situations is to protect persons involved in business transactions where a
payment obligation has been assumed by a third party.
The court is correct in its decision but an explanation of the workings and
legal import of a teller's or certified check would be in order. Drawer Savings
Bank is more than a drawer of the teller's check. It issued a teller's check pay-
able to the payee in payment of an obligation it owed to the buyer Miss Kuebler.
Miss Kuebler performed her part of the contract with the Savings Bank by per-
mitting the Savings Bank to withdraw $450 from her account. Under section
3-802 of the Code, Miss Kuebler is discharged on her underlying obligation to
the payee, she not having drawn nor indorsed the teller's check. The drawer
Savings Bank sets aside funds immediately available for payment at the time of
issuing the check. In other words, the drawer Savings Bank has accepted the
duty to pay the check at the time of issuance. Payee and drawer Savings Bank
also have an implied contractual relationship: payee has a duty to present the
19. Instant case at 707, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 983.
20. "Unless otherwise agreed where an instrument is taken for an underlying obligation
(a) the obligation is pro tanto discharged if a bank is drawer, maker or acceptor of the
instrument and there is no recourse on the instrument against the underlying obligor."
21. Instant case at 707, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 983.
22. See N.Y. U.C.C. § 3-802(1), supra note 20.
23. Maurice O'Meara Co. v. National Park Bank, 239 N.Y. 386, 395, 146 N.E. 636, 639
(1925).
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check and the right to receive payment, while drawer Savings Bank has a duty
to pay the check upon presentment. Neither of the contractual relationships con-
cerns the underlying sales contract concluded between Miss Kuebler and the
payee. Certified checks bear a similar characteristic: the bank becomes a party to
the certification with the drawer, payee, or holder,24 but not a party to the
underlying transaction between drawer and payee. The Uniform Commercial
Code implies that there is no right to stop payment on a check that has been
certified.25 However, neither the Code nor the common law explicitly states that
there is no stop payment on a teller's check. In the instant case, stop payment
on the teller's check was not permitted because the drawer Savings Bank accepted
the check when issued and thereby acquired a sole primary obligation without
regard to any underlying sales transaction. Moreover, since a check is a draft
drawn on a bank,26 section 3-118(a) of the Code further supports a primary
obligation theory. "... . A draft drawn on the drawer is effective as a note." 27 The
drawer Savings Bank has accepted the check (draft) at the time of issuance.
Hence, the teller's check is constructively drawn on the drawer Savings Bank,28
and the teller's check is effective as a note. Drawer Savings Bank as maker of a
note has a primary liability on the instrument.29 The court should have based
its decision more on the true nature of a teller's check and a primary obligation
theory than on a policy standpoint of protecting payees.
MARSHALL L. COHEN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LoCAL LAW SETTING RESIDENCE REQUIRE-
M ENTS FOR LOCAL POLICE OFFICERS INVALID AS CONFLICTING WITH VALID
STATE STATUTE
The New York Public Officers Law states that all policemen in New York
State are exempt from local residence requirements if they were appointed prior
to July 1, 1961, and live in the county in which they work, provided that the
police force of which the officer is a member consists of less than two hundred
full-time members.' In October of 1964, the City of Peekskill passed a local law
requiring all police officers employed within that city to live within the city
limits.2 The City of Peekskill contains less than two hundred full-time policemen.
Three policemen in the City of Peekskill, who were appointed prior to July 1,
24. See Carnegie Trust Co. v. First Natl Bank, 213 N.Y. 307, 107 N.E. 695 (1915).
25. See supra note 16.
26. N.Y. U.C.C. § 3-104(2) (b).
27. N.Y. U.C.C. § 3-118(a).
28. The teller's check would have been drawn on the drawer Savings Bank except for
the fact that savings banks in New York are not permitted to maintain checking accounts.
See supra note 8.
29. See 1 H-awkland, Transactional Guide to the Uniform Commercial Code 478 (1964).
1. N.Y. Pub. Officers Law § 30 (Supp. 1965).
2. City of Peekskill, Local Law No. 3 (1964).
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